عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

Indirectly productive entrepreneurship

ترجمه عنوان مقاله: کارآفرینی سازنده به طور غیر مستقیم

رشته: کارآفرینی

سال انتشار: 2016

تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 16 صفحه

منبع: Emerald

نوع فایل: pdf

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چکیده مقاله

Purpose: Since Baumol (1990), the economic literature has distinguished between two broad categories of entrepreneurship: productive and unproductive. The purpose of this paper is to introduce another subcategory: indirectly productive entrepreneurship. Sometimes, profit-seeking entrepreneurs allocate their talents to indirectly productive activities to mitigate the new costs market participants endure as a result of a government regulation. The resources used to mitigate these costs must be diverted from other uses.

Design/methodology/approach: This paper uses the example of cell phone storage outside New York City’s high schools to illustrate an indirectly productive entrepreneurial activity that mitigates the inefficiencies or costs created by a regulation. These costs and the resulting entrepreneurship would not have arisen absent the regulation.

Findings: These profit opportunities do not result from market entrepreneurial errors or successes but emerge from inefficiencies or unintended consequences produced by government regulations. When evaluating such entrepreneurship, the question is whether such regulation is desirable from an efficiency viewpoint because such entrepreneurship, while making such regulation less inefficient or less costly, diverts resources from other lines of production.

Originality/value: This paper identifies a new category of entrepreneurship: indirectly productive entrepreneurship. This paper also shows that government regulation often deters productive entrepreneurship. However, under some circumstances, regulation can indirectly encourage productive entrepreneurship by creating artificial profit opportunities that would not have existed otherwise.

Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Public policy, Regulatory policy, Law and economics

مقدمه مقاله

William Baumol’s (1990) seminal paper showed that entrepreneurs need not allocate their talents to productive activities to make profits. According to Baumol, how entrepreneurs allocate their talents between productive activities such as innovation and unproductive activities such as rent seeking depends on the institutional environment these entrepreneurs operate in and the reward system it creates[1]. The rules of the game matter, and when these rules reward one type of entrepreneurial activity over others, we should see more of this type of entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990, p. 894)[2]. More importantly, the rules of the game matter because the resulting allocation of entrepreneurial talent can determine whether a country will experience economic growth.

Murphy et al. (1991) have subsequently shown that countries where the rules of the game reward unproductive entrepreneurship more than productive entrepreneurship experience lower economic growth rates than countries where the rules of the game reward productive entrepreneurship more than unproductive entrepreneurship. At the state level, Sobel (2008) tests Baumol’s (1990) hypothesis and estimates how the quality of state political and legal institutions correlates with the level of net entrepreneurial productivity[3]. States with higherquality political and legal institutions exhibit higher and positive levels of net entrepreneurial productivity (Sobel, 2008, pp. 647-649). As a result, they also exhibit higher levels of economic well-being as measured by median household income and average per capita personal income (Sobel, 2008, p. 651).

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