عنوان انگلیسی مقاله:

Country risk, country size, and tax competition for foreign direct investment

ترجمه عنوان مقاله: ریسک کشور، اندازه کشور و رقابت مالیاتی در سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی

$$$: فقط 8500 تومان

سال انتشار: 2010

تعداد صفحات مقاله انگلیسی: 10 صفحه

تعداد صفحات ترجمه مقاله: 23 صفحه

منبع: الزویر و ساینس دایرکت

نوع فایل: word

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فهرست مطالب
  • چکیده
  • مقدمه
  • مدل
  • احتمالات متقارن ریسک کشور
  • انتخاب انحصار گرایی خارجی
  • رقابت های مالیاتی بوسیله دو دولت
  • عدم تقارن احتمالات ریسک کشورها
  • انتخاب انحصار خارجی
  • رقابت مالیاتی بوسیله دو کشور
  • نتیجه گیری
  • منابع

ترجمه چکیده مقاله

این مقاله، رقابت مالیاتی برای سرمایه گذاری مستقیم  ریسک کشور، با استفاده از مدل دو کشوری با اندازه بازار های متفاوت را تجزیه و تحلیل می کند. ما نشان دادیم که سنجش بین انداره کشورها به عنوان مزیت منطقه ای و ریسک کشورها به عنوان یک ضعف منطقه ای، بر انتخاب منطقه یک موسسه خارجی تاثیر دارد. با توجه به این شرایط محیطی که موسسات خارجی با احتمالات یکسان ریسک کشورها در هر دو کشور بالقوه، در هنگام تصمیم گیری درباره ی مکان سرمایه گذاری، مواجه هستند، تجزیه و تحلیل ما نشان می دهد که اگر اندازه بازارهای کشورهایی با ریسک بالا به اندازه کافی بزرگ باشند در ارتباط با کشورهای کم ریسک،  موسسات خارجی از انتخاب کشورهایی با ریسک بالا حتی اگر دولت کشورهای میزبان مالیات های سنگینی را تحمیل کنند دارای منفعت است. با توجه به شرایطی که موسسات خارجی با احتمالات متفاوت ریسک کشورها در هر کشور میزبانی مواجه هستند، نتایج ما نشان می دهد که موضوع مهم برای موسسات خارجی این است چه کشور میزبان هزینه بالایی داشته باشد یا هزینه پایین، کشور میزبان کشور پر ریسک است.

کلمات کلیدی: رقابت مالیاتی، سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی، اندازه کشور

ترجمه مقدمه مقاله

جهانی سازی و ادغام های اقتصادی منجر به افزایش فعالیت های اقتصادی بین المللی مانند سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی شده اند، که این نیز به نوبه خود موجب افزایش علاقه در تجزیه و تحلیل تئوریک رقابت های مالیاتی برای سرمایه گذاری های مستقیم خارجی شده است. بازتاب این وضعیت را می توان در تعداد زیادی از مقالات که رقابت های مالیاتی در زمینه سرمایه گذاری های مستقیم خارجی را مورد مطالعه قرار داده است مشاهده کرد. پیشگامانی که در این زمینه مشارکت کرده اند، هافلر و وتون[1] (1999) مدلی را برای رقابت مالیاتی سرمایه گذاری خارجی ایجاد کردند. مدل انها از یک مدل دو کشوری ساده استفاده کرده است، مدلی که در ان هیچ شرکت داخلی وجود ندارد، با استفاده از دو کشور بالقوه با اندازه های بازار نامتقارن که با یکدیگر برای جذب سرمایه گذاری خارجی در رقابت می باشند استفاده شده است. این مطالعات نشان داد که، موسسه خارجی انحصار گرا، ترجیح میدهد که در کشوری با اندازه ی بازار بزرگ سرمایه گذاری کند حتی زمانی که، دولت کشور میزبان مالیات های سنگینی را اعمال کند.

تعدادی از مطالعات تلاش کرده اند برای مدل استادانه ای برای مدل  هافلر و وتون  (1999) ارائه شود. برای مثال، فامگلای (2003) رقابت مالیاتی برای سرمایه گذاری مستقیم خارجی بین دو منطقه  که دارای سطوح مختلف تکنولوژی هستند را تحت فرض این که ان دو منطقه دارای بازار هایی یکسان از لحاظ اندازه هستند را مورد ازمون قرار دهد.  اکل و بجوروتن (2006)رقابت های مالیاتی را برای FDI در بین کشورهای نامتقارن بوسیله کاستن ساختار بازار از نحوه عمل هافلر و ووتان را تجزیه و تحلیل کردند و نشان دادند که تفاوت ها در ساختار بازار، بر مفهوم رفاه رقابت مالیاتی و انتخاب محل برای موسسات خارجی،  تاثیر و نفوذ دارد. آن ها نشان دادند که سیاست های رقابتی، جذابیت کشورهای کوچک به عنوان محلی برای سرمایه گذاری را افزایش میدهد. هافلر و ووتان (2006)، سیاست های یکطرفه و هماهنگ شده مالیاتی را در اتحاد دو منطقه ای که با پتانسیل منطقه میزبان رقابت می کند.  هائو و لاهیری (2009) دولت های غیر فعال و فعال در کشورهای میزبان در انتخاب مکان برای موسسات خارجی بوسیله بررسی تولیدکارایی در میان شرکتهای داخلی و خارجی را مورد بررسی قرار دادند. میترمیر (2009) نقش صاحبان موسسات در رقابت های مالیاتی برای FDI های تحت اندازه های بازار های نامتقارن در کشورهای میزبان را مطالعه کرد و  نشان داد که در سیاست های رقابتب، انتخاب مکان موسسات خارجی بوسیله شروط صاحبان موسسات لازم در کشورهای میزبان، تحت تاثیر قرار می گیرد.

ترجمه قسمتی از نتیجه گیری مقاله

ما مدل ساده ی رقابت های مالیاتی را برای FDI با ریسک کشور و با استفاده از مدل دو کشوری با اندازه ی بازار های متفاوت، گسترش دادیم. از نقطه نظر تجزیه و تحلیل تئوری، ما تجزیه و تحلیل کرده ایم که چطور تحت وجود کشور، رقابت مالیاتی بویسله دولت های میزبان بر انتخاب مکان از طرف انحصار گرایی موسسه خارجی به عنوان توان بالقوه داوطلب جدید در بازار خارجی، تاثیر می گذارد. ما دو نوع شرایط را بررسی کردیم: موقعیتی که موسسه خارجی با احتمالات مشابه ریسک کشور در هر دو کشور میزبان بالقوه مواجه است در زمان تصمیم گیری برای انتخاب مکان سرمایه گذاری و موقعیت دیگری که موسسه خارجی با احتمالات متفاوت ریسک کشور در هر دو کشور میزبان بالقوه در هنگامی که مبادرت به انتخاب مکانی برای سرمایه گذاری می کند، مواجه است.

در هر دوی این موقعیت ها، تجزیه و تحلیل ما نشان میدهد که تعادل در ناشی به اندازه بازار بزرگ کشوری که به عنوان منفعت مکانی و ریسک کشور به عنوان عامل بازدارنده بر انتخاب مکان سرمایه گذاری موسسه خارجی موثر است. تحت این مورد که موسسه خارجی یا احتمالات مشابه از ریسک در هر دو کشور بالقوه برای سرمایه گذاری مواجه است، ما نشان دادیم که، اگر اندازه ی بازار کشور با ریسک بالاتر به اندازه ی کافی بزرگ باشد مرتبط با کشور با ریسک کمتر، موسسه خارجی از تسویه در داخل کشور بزرگتر با ریسک بالاتر منتفع می شود حتی اگر دولت کشور میزبان هزینه مالیاتی را به موسسه خارجی تحمیل کند. اگرچه، تحت این موقعیت، ما نشان دادیم که چیزی که برای موسسه خارجی مهم است، چه کشور میزبان با ریسک بالا باشد چه با ریسک پایین باشد، کشور میزبان با ریسک بالا است.

چکیده انگلیسی مقاله

This paper analyzes tax competition for foreign direct investment with country risk using atwo-country model with different market sizes. We show that the trade-off between country size as a locational advantage and country risk as a locational disadvantage affects the location choice of a foreign firm. Given the circumstance in which the foreign firm faces the same probabilities of country risk in both potential host countries when deciding investment location, our analysis shows that if the market size of the high-risk country is sufficiently large relative to the low-risk country, the foreign firm benefits from choosing the high-risk larger country even if the host country’s government imposes a lump-sum tax. Given the situation in which the foreign firm faces different probabilities of country risk in each host country, our results show that the important matter for the foreign firm is whether the host country is highcost or low-cost, rather than whether the host country is high-risk.
Keywords: Tax competition, Foreign direct investment, Country size, Country risk

مقدمه انگلیسی مقاله

Globalization and economic integration have led to the increase of international economic activity such as foreign direct investment (FDI),which has in turn increased interest intheoretical analysis of tax competition for FDI. Reflecting this situation, a large number of papers have studied tax competition for FDI.1 In a pioneering contribution to this field, Haufler andWooton (1999) (aswell as Haufler, 2001) developed a tax competitionmodel for FDI. Their study employed a simple two-countrymodel inwhich therewere no domestic incumbent firms, using two potential host countrieswith asymmetricmarket sizes competingwith each other to attract a foreign-owned monopolist. This study concluded that the foreign monopolist prefers to be located in a host country with a larger market, even if the government of that country imposes a positive tax rate when the market size is significantly large.
Several studies have attempted to elaborate on the model of Haufler and Wooton (1999).2 For example, Fumagalli (2003) examined tax competition for FDI between two regions that differ in firm technology levels under the assumption that the regions had the same market sizes. Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) analyzed tax competition for FDI between asymmetric countries by loosening the market structure of Haufler and Wooton’s framework, and showed that differences in the market structure influence both the welfare implications of tax competition and the location choice of the foreign firm. They also showed that policy competition increases the attractiveness of a small country as an investment location. Haufler and Wooton (2006) analyzed unilateral and coordinated tax policy in a union of two regions which competes with a potential host region. Hao and Lahiri (2009) investigated passive and active governments in host countries in the location choice of the foreign firm by considering production efficiency among the domestic and foreign firms. Mittermaier (2009) studied the role of firm ownership in tax competition for FDI under asymmetric market sizes in host countries and showed that in policy competition, the location choice of the foreign firm is affected by ownership conditions of incumbent firms in host countries.
None of the studies listed above were concerned with the country risk that foreign firms face when investing in host
countries; these studies focused on country size differentials, the numbers of domestic firms, production cost differentials, the role of firm ownership, unemployment, the coordination of tax policy, and so on. However, in the real world, a great deal of risk accompanies FDI.3 Indeed, any international investment project bears two types of risk: project-related risks and host countryrelated risks (Marjit, Broll, & Mallick, 1995).
Many empirical studies have investigated the relationship between FDI and country risk (e.g., Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Asiedu, Jin, & Nandwa, 2009; Bevan & Estrin, 2004; Carstensen & Toubal, 2004; Fosfuri, 2004; Janicki &Wunnava, 2004; Mancuso, Dirienzo, & Das, 2010; Mody & Srinivasan, 1998; Wheeler & Mody, 1992; Yang, 2008), and some of them have shown a negative correlation between FDI and country risk.4 In the literature on the theoretical analysis, several studies analyzed FDI by incorporating the concept of country risk into the model (e.g., Aizenman & Marion, 2004; Albuquerque, 2003; Broll & Zilcha, 1992; Marjit et al., 1995; Raff & Srinivasan, 1998; Schnitzer, 1999; Straub, 2008; Thomas & Worrall, 1994). These studies dealt with FDI and country risk, but did not examine competition between host countries (or regions). To our knowledge, there are no studies on tax competition for FDI that include country risk. That is, the existing works might have neglected to take into account country risk in analyzing tax competition for FDI. Therefore, by investigating tax competition for FDI with country risk from the point of view of the theoretical analysis, we might be able to provide additional insight into the literature in this field.
In this paper, we develop a simple tax competition model for FDI with country risk by using the two-country model in which there exists a high-risk country and a low-risk country. Our study analyzes how with the existence of country risk, tax competition by host countries’ governments influences the location choice of the foreign monopolist (or foreign firm) who is a potential new entrant into the foreign market, focusing on market size and transportation costs. We consider two situations: first, we investigate a situation in which the probabilities that the foreign firm faces country risk are the same in both potential host countries when choosing an investment location. Second, we examine the situation in which the probabilities that the foreign firm faces country risk are not the same in both host countries. The difference between these situations is affected by whether the two countries are geographically close, or whether the various spatial factors of the host countries are similar.5 In addition, the probabilities that the foreign firm faces country risk affect whether the host country is high-cost or low-cost.
We show that under the case that the foreign firm faces the same probabilities of country risk, if the market size of the high-risk country is sufficiently large relative to the low-risk country, the foreign firm benefits from settling within the high-risk larger country, in which the host country’s government charges a lump-sum tax to the foreign firm. The foreign firm prefers to locate within the low-risk small country when the market sizes of the two host countries are approximately the same, and the foreign firm chooses to invest in the low-risk country if the unit trade cost is low. Under the case that the probabilities of country risk are different, we show that the foreign firm prefers to invest in the low-cost country if the trade cost is relatively small, while the foreign firm prefers to invest in the country with a large market if the trade cost is relatively large, even if the investment location is a more costly country. These results imply that the trade-off (the large market size of the country as a locational advantage versus country risk as a locational disadvantage), affects the location choice of a foreign firm wanting to invest in one of the potential host countries. However, under a situation in which the probabilities of country risk are different, our analysis shows that what is important for the foreign firm is not country risk, but whether the host country is high-cost or low-cost.
Our study adopts the framework of Haufler andWooton (1999) in the sense that the foreign monopolist attempts to invest in one of the host countries where domestic incumbent firms do not exist. As we believe that country risk affects the productivity of the foreign firm, our study is nearer to those of Fumagalli (2003) and Hao and Lahiri (2009),who investigated tax competition for FDI by considering the productivity of firms.6 However, they did not examine tax competition for FDI fromthe point of viewof country risk; therefore, the present paper has a different viewpoint fromtheirworks.Moreover, our studymight relate to that of Raff and Srinivasan (1998), who analyzed tax incentives as a signal by the government of the host country by considering country risk. They provided theoretical analysis aswell as empirical results, but did not dealwith tax competition between potential host countries. In contrast,we provide a more simple tax competition model without the signaling game to investigate the foreign firm’s location choice for FDI.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the situation in which the probabilities that the foreign firm faces country risk are the same in both potential host countries when deciding investment location. Section 4 studies the circumstance that the probabilities of country risk for the foreign firm are not the same in both host countries when choosing an investment location. Section 5 concludes the paper.

نتیجه گیری انگلیسی مقاله

We have developed a simple tax competition model for FDI with country risk using the two-country model with different market sizes. From the point of view of the theoretical analysis, we have analyzed how under the existence of country risk, tax competition by host countries’ governments affects the location choice of the foreign monopolist as a potential new entrant into the foreign market. We have investigated two situations: the situation in which the foreign firm faces the same probabilities of country risk in both potential host countries when deciding investment location and the situation in which the foreign firm faces different probabilities of country risk in each host country when choosing an investment location.
In both situations, our analysis has shown that the trade-off due to the large market size of a country as a locational advantage and country risk as a locational disadvantage affect the location choice of the foreign firm. Under the case that the foreign firm faces the same probabilities of country risk in both potential host countries, we have shown that, if the market size of the high-risk country is sufficiently large relative to the low-risk country, the foreign firm benefits from settling within the high-risk larger country even if the host country’s government charges a lump-sum tax to the foreign firm. However, under the situation that the foreign firm faces different probabilities of country risk in each host country when choosing an investment location, we have shown that what is important for the foreign firm is whether the host country is high-cost or low-cost, rather than whether the host country is a high-risk (i.e., country risk).
In our study, by focusing on country size and unit trade cost given the existence of country risk, the foreign firm’s decision of investment locationwas analyzed. Of course, in the real world, the foreign firm’s location choice for FDI does not depend only on these factors. However,while the existing studies examined tax competition for FDIwithout taking country risk into account, the present study incorporated country risk into themodel and analyzed tax competition for FDI. Hence,we believe that our research is the first step in studying tax competition for FDI with country risk, and may contribute to analysis in this field. Indeed, our results show that given the existence of country risk, the foreign firm prefers to invest in the low-cost country whether the potential host country has a large market or not. This implies that there exists the possibility that even a small country becomes an appealing investment location for the foreign firm if the small country is the low-cost country. This result differs from that of existing works (e.g., Haufler &Wooton, 1999); rather, our results might be closer to the results of Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006) in the sense that we have shown that the smaller country can become the more attractive investment location given certain circumstances.
The results of our study may help remedy the lack of theoretical analysis of tax competition for FDI with country risk. However, the results derived in our study might depend on the simple tax competition model for FDI with country risk that we adopted. The incorporation of the risk-reduction investment by the government into the model may provide an interesting result. In addition, in order to confirmthe results of our study, itmight be necessary to estimate the correlation between distance and size, or between distance and risk, from the aspect of empirical study. These issues constitute potential considerations for future research.